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Abstract
There is a distinct place for legal doctrinal methods in legal-
interdisciplinary research methodologies, but there is value
to be had in expounding that place – in developing a deeper
understanding, for instance, of what legal doctrinal analysis
has to offer, wherein lies its limitations, and how it could
work in concert with methods and theories from disciplinary
areas other than law. This article offers such perspectives,
based on experiences with an ‘advanced’ legal-interdiscipli-
nary methodology, which facilitates a long-term study of
the growing body of practice generated by citizen-driven,
independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs) that are
institutionally affiliated with multilateral development banks.
The article demonstrates how legal doctrinal methods have
contributed towards the design and development of a multi-
purpose IAM-practice database. This database constitutes
the analytical platform of the research project and also facili-
tates the integration of various types of research questions,
methods and theories.
Keywords: legal doctrinal methods, legal interdisciplinarity,
multilateral development banks, interdependent accounta-
bility mechanisms, database
1 Introduction
There is a distinct place for legal doctrinal methods in
legal-interdisciplinary research methodologies, but there
is value to be had in expounding that place – in develop-
ing a deeper understanding, for instance, of what legal
doctrinal analysis has to offer, wherein lies its limita-
tions, and how it could work in concert with methods
and theories from disciplinary areas other than law.
Such insights might strengthen our efforts to design
‘advanced’ legal-interdisciplinary research methodologies,1
* Research Associate, Erasmus University Rotterdam, School of Law.
1. See M. Siems, ‘The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Find-
ing a Way Out of the Desert’, 7 Journal of Commonwealth Law and
Legal Education 5 (2009), describing ‘advanced’ legal-interdisciplinary
research methodologies as approaches that address both ‘legal and
non-legal questions’ and integrate ‘“scientific” methods’ as well as non-
legal theory ‘into legal thinking’.
in particular, and to deploy such methodologies in trans-
national regulatory governance research contexts2 where
the need for and place of legal normativity are often con-
tested – or as Orford puts it, where law, ‘as a source of
constraints on the abuses of hegemonic power’ finds
itself at ‘the limits of modern political organization’.3
This article aims to contribute to the development of
such insights. The perspectives offered here are based
on the author’s experiences with designing and deploy-
ing an advanced legal-interdisciplinary methodology
underlying a long-term research project. The project
studies the growing body of practice generated by citi-
zen-driven, independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs)
that are institutionally affiliated with multilateral devel-
opment banks (MDBs), such as the World Bank’s
2. Referring to a ‘concept [that] has become a widely used analytical per-
spective for describing the conduct of world affairs in many disciplines’
and that has become known by different designations and associated
with different definitions, including ‘global governance’ (see A. Von
Bogdandy, P. Dann & M. Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of
Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Gover-
nance Activities’, in A. Von Bogdandy, R. Wolfrum, J. Von Bernstorff, P.
Dann & M. Goldmann (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by Inter-
national Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law (2010)
3, at 7), ‘global regulatory governance’ (see Kingsbury, below n. 15),
and ‘post-national governance’ (see N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutional-
ism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010), at 4-6). As
defined here, transnational regulatory governance refers to governance
and regulation ‘beyond the State’ – because it concerns the ‘activities,
institutions, actors or processes that cross at least one national border’,
and typically involves ‘actors other than national governments’. (See T.
Hale and D. Held, ‘Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in Transna-
tional Governance’, in T. Hale and D. (eds.), Handbook of Transnation-
al Governance (2011) 1, at 5.)
3. See A. Orford, ‘A Jurisprudence of the Limit’, in A. Orford (ed.), Inter-
national Law and Its Others (2006) 1, at 1-31. On the recognition of
the need for legal normativity as basis for the construction of legal sys-
tems, see e.g. J. Brunnée and S. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in
International Law (2010), at 7-55.
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Inspection Panel.4 The article focuses on the place occu-
pied by legal doctrinal analysis regarding a particular
aspect of the research methodology, namely: the design
and development of a multi-purpose IAM-practice data-
base (‘IAM-practice database’ or ‘database’).5
Section 2 of the article contextualises this discussion by
situating IAMs in the particular transnational regulatory
governance context in which they operate – that is, the
transnational development context. Section 3 provides an
overview of the research project and its underlying
methodology, while emphasising aspects related to the
IAM-practice database.
Section 4 explains the role of legal doctrinal analysis
with respect to the design and development of the IAM-
practice database. Section 5 concludes the discussion by
reflecting on the significance of the experiences shared
in this article – not only for the design and deployment
of advanced legal-interdisciplinary research methodolo-
gies but also for deepening our understanding of the
place of law in transnational regulatory governance con-
texts.
Before proceeding with this discussion, however, it is
necessary to clarify a few assumptions and explain the
core concepts underlying this article.
1.1 Clarifying Basic Assumptions and Core
Concepts
This article assumes that its primary audience is legal
scholars engaged (or interested) in conducting legal-
interdisciplinary research, although the experiences
shared here can certainly be of broader interest. This
assumption, however, has implications for the content
included in this article and, especially, how it is presen-
ted.
For instance, the article further assumes that legal
scholars are generally unfamiliar with the terminology,
methods and theories employed in the disciplinary areas
involved in database design and development; hence,
4. On the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, see <http:// go. worldbank. org/
7RCPYOF0C0>. Other IAMs included in the project’s scope are the IFC
and MIGA’s Compliance Advisory Ombudsman (<http:// www. cao -
ombudsman. org/>), the AfDB’s Independent Review Mechanism
(<http:// www. afdb. org/ en/ about -us/ structure/ independent -review -
mechanism/>), the ADB’s Accountability Mechanism (<http:// www.
adb. org/ site/ accountability -mechanism/ main>), the IADB’s Indepen-
dent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (<http:// www. iadb.
org/ en/ mici/ independent -consultation -and -investigation -mechanism -
icim,1752. html>) and the EBRD’s Project Complaints Mechanism
(<http:// www. ebrd. com/ pages/ project/ pcm. shtml>) (all websites, last
visited 31 October 2015).
5. Also note, examples of legal-interdisciplinary approaches in public inter-
national law remain sparse – e.g. there is only one contribution on ‘law’
in The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity (see M. Averill, ‘Law,’ in
R. Frodeman, J.T. Klein & C. Mithcham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Interdisciplinarity (2010), at 522); whereas the American International
Law Journal’s ‘Symposium on Method in International Law’ contains
only one contribution that employs a ‘purposefully interdisciplinary
approach’ (see 3 American Journal of International Law, at 291
(1999)); and in Research Methods for Law, the only contribution rela-
ted to international legal research focuses primarily on state actors and
the conventional sources of international law, whereas no mention is
made of the role of legal-interdisciplinary approaches in this contribu-
tion (see S. Hall, ‘Researching International Law’, in M. McConville and
W. Hong Chui (eds.), Research Methods for Law (2007), at 181.
the ‘technical’ aspects of the discussion are kept to a
minimum whereas the focus falls on the principles
underlying the design and development of the database
in question.
In fact, an important lesson derived from the experien-
ces shared in this article is that deep technical skills are
not a prerequisite for legal scholars to engage in the type
of research described here. And this is not only because
technical aspects can be delegated or outsourced to com-
petent individuals. The lesson, instead, is that an inter-
mediate level of proficiency with standard software such
as MS Excel as well as a sound understanding of the
principles behind key theoretical concepts and analytical
tools employed in an area such as IT project manage-
ment,6 for instance, can be decidedly effective – not to
mention, cost efficient.
The article also assumes that legal scholars (including
many of those specialising in public international law)
are not as familiar with the wide range of independent
accountability mechanisms operating at the internation-
al (or transnational) level than they are with internation-
al, regional, and national judicial institutions; nor are
they as familiar with the development-lending opera-
tions of MDBs than they typically are with the opera-
tions of international institutions such as the United
Nations.7 Hence, Section 2 provides more background
detail than what might typically be expected in an article
focusing on methodology.
As to the meaning of legal doctrinal research or scholar-
ship, this article considers its activities as including the
‘study, description, explanation and analysis’ of the
‘(conflicting) underlying values, presuppositions and
principles’ contained in ‘current positive law’.8 The
principle purpose of legal doctrinal research, moreover,
is usually to provide explicit normative comment (‘how
things should be’) in order to formulate ‘needed propos-
als for improvement’.9 Whereas legal doctrinal analysis
employs, in essence, the same analytical and conceptual
tools – methods – that ‘abundantly’ serve ‘judges’, name-
ly: ‘textual analysis’, ‘practical argumentation’ as well as
principled or structured ‘reasoning’.10
6. See e.g. J.L. Brewer and K.C. Dittman, Methods of IT Project Manage-
ment, 2nd edn. (2008); and Project Management Institute, A Guide to
the Project Management Body of Knowledge, 5th edn. (2013).
7. I am not alone in making this observation – see e.g. D.D. Bradlow and
D. Hunter (eds.), International Financial Institutions and International
Law (2010), remarking (at xxviii-xxix) that it is ‘striking how little atten-
tion has been paid to the international legal issues relating to the opera-
tions of the International Monitory Fund, the World Bank Group, and
the regional development banks …’.
8. J. Vranken, ‘Exciting Times for Legal Scholarship’, 2 Recht en Methode
in Onderzoek en Onderwijs 42, at 43 (2012).
9. Id.
10. Id., at 43-4. Also see Taekema’s comment at note 126.
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Current positive law, in turn, refers to legal norms11 –
but these norms can be ‘written and unwritten’ and can
originate from formal and informal norm-creation pro-
cesses.12 Insofar as public international law is concerned,
its norms are often captured in atypical ‘forms of writ-
ten sources such as reports, documents, explanations,
protocols, and papers’, and also have ‘more unwritten’ –
and informal – ‘law that othe[r]’ areas of law.13
In other words, while the article recognises the ‘conven-
tional’ sources of ‘current positive [public international]
law’ (as set out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice),14 it also considers the
wide array of ‘concoctions’ of ‘formal and informal
instruments’ as being part of ‘current’ – and emerging –
‘positive law’.15 Grounded in an ‘interactional account’
of public international law (as reflected, notably, in the
scholarship of Brunnée and Toope),16 the IAM-practice
research project is specifically interested in the norms
that emerge from the ‘contested terrain in the no-man’s
11. I.e. as opposed to non-legal or social norms. Also note, this article
employs Toope’s argument that ‘[t]he category of ‘norm’ is inclusive
and general. A norm may be vague or specific – it may mean a wide-
spread social practice, a social prescription, a legal principle articulated
to shape the evolution of a regime, or a precise legal rule. The common
core of the concept of ‘norm’ is that the desideratum contained in the
norm is intended to influence human conduct. Note the word ‘influ-
ence’: norms do not necessarily determine human action. They help to
shape behaviour, but they rarely if ever dictate it. Since norms operate
in many different ways, they relate to the concepts of formality and
informality differentially as well. Norms can be formal rules of law, but
they can also be informal social guides to proper conduct.’ See S.
Toope, ‘Formality and Informality’, in D. Bodanksy, J. Brunnée & E. Hey
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law
(2007) 107, at 107.
12. See Vranken, above n. 8, at 43. On the distinction between ‘formal’
and ‘informal’ norms and of the significance of this distinction in inter-
national law, see e.g. Toope, above n. 11, at 107 (arguing that ‘norms
can be informal and precise as well as informal and vague’; which is to
say, ‘formality’ is not an appropriate test for the existence of non-exis-
tence of law’). For a contrasting view on the importance of formality in
public international law, see in general J. D’Aspremont, Formalism and
the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of
Legal Rules (2011).
13. See Vranken, above n. 8, at 43.
14. I.e. ‘international conventions’, ‘international custom’, ‘the general prin-
ciples of law recognised by civilised nations’, and (as ‘subsidiary means’
for establishing the ‘rules of law’, ‘judicial decisions’, and ‘the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’. For a dis-
cussion of the conventional sources of public international law, see e.g.
M.N. Shaw, International Law, 6th edn. (2008), at 70-127.
15. B. Kingsbury, ‘Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of
Global Regulatory Governance’, in H. Cissé, D.D. Bradlow & B. Kings-
bury (eds.), The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial
Institutions and Global Legal Governance (2012), e-Book.
16. See J. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International
Law: An Interactional Account (2010). The authors explain (Id., at
5-55) that their ‘international account of international law’ has been
based in the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller as well as in constructivist
thinking employed in the area of international relations. The authors
argue (Id., at 22-4) that law is ‘best viewed’ as involving ‘continuing
challenge rather than as a finished project’ since it is ‘formed and main-
tained through continuing struggles of social practice’ and ‘is the work
of its everyday participants’, who engage in ‘a continuous effort to con-
struct and sustain a common institutional framework to meet the exi-
gencies of social life in accordance with certain ideals’. Moreover, legal
norms can be distinguished from non-legal or social norms by employ-
ing ‘criteria’ that assess their relative degrees of ‘legality’ and ‘obliga-
tion’ (Id.).
land between international law and politics’, and also in
the actors involved in the application and enforcement
of these norms.17
Interdisciplinarity describes research approaches that
facilitate ‘the appropriate combination of knowledge
from many different specialities’ – whereas ‘knowledge’
might refer to either theory or methods, or to both.18
This article views the primary purpose of an interdisci-
plinary approach (or, the principle motivating factor for
employing such an approach) as ‘problem solving in the
real world’.19 Interdisciplinary approaches, despite their
challenges, are well equipped to facilitate inquiry that
can ‘shed new light on … actual problem[s]’.20 There-
fore, the research methodology that forms the subject of
this discussion fits within the broader ‘transdisciplinary
research’ (TR) school of thought, which ‘aims at better
fitting academic knowledge production to societal needs
for solving, mitigating, or preventing problems’.21 TR is
concerned with developing and employing theory and
analytical methods that might aid interdisciplinary
researchers in
grasp[ing] the relevant complexity of a problem, tak-
ing into account the diversity of both everyday and
academic perceptions of problems, linking abstract
and case-specific knowledge, and developing descrip-
tive, normative and practical knowledge for the com-
mon interest.22
Legal interdisciplinarity, finally, describes a range of dif-
ferent approaches that obtain ‘input’ from disciplines
other than law, but where such ‘input’ ‘serves’, in
essence, ‘as a necessary contribution to … legal argu-
17. Toope, above n. 11, at 107. Also see C. Chinkin, ‘Normative Develop-
ment in the International Legal System’, in D. Shelton (ed.), Commit-
ment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the Interna-
tional Legal System (2000) 21, at 23 (n. 13): ‘[T]here is a “brave new
world of international law” where “transnational actors, sources of law,
allocation of decision function and modes of regulation have all muta-
ted into fascinating hybrid forms. International Law now comprises a
complex blend of customary, positive, declarative and soft law”.’ Chin-
kin notes, however: ‘Current debates about the forms and functions of
international law-making are a continuation of long-standing tensions
between those who assert the paramountcy of state consent and those
who urge limitations on state action in favour of international regula-
tion.’ (Id., at 21). For an overview of the major arguments in these juris-
prudential debates, see e.g. B. Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance
as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law’, 19
Michigan Journal of International Law 345, at 348-67 (1997-1998);
and I. Scobbie, ‘Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory
and International Law,’ in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, 2nd
edn. (2006) 83, at 83-156.
18. G. Brewer, ‘The Challenges of Interdisciplinarity’, 32 Policy Sciences
327 (1999), at 328; and see Siems, above at n. 1.
19. See G. Hirsch Hadorn, C. Pohl, & G. Bammer, ‘Solving Problems
through Transdisciplinary Research’, in R. Frodeman, J.T. Klein & C.
Mithcham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity (2010)
431, at 431.
20. See Brewer, above n. 18, at 328. The author adds (at Id.): ‘In notably
effective efforts, the combination of disciplines adds value: the total is
more interesting than the sum of the individual contributions or parts’.
21. Hirsch Hadorn et al., above n. 19, at 431.
22. Id.
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ments’.23 Different legal-interdisciplinary approaches
have been conceptualised as a continuum that envisages
relative degrees of integration between ‘law’ and ‘non-
legal disciplines’. The legal-interdisciplinary methodol-
ogy described in this article might be described as ‘aux-
iliary’,24 ‘intermediate’25 – or, positioned towards the
middle-range of the continuum. However, as a research
methodology facilitating long-term interdisciplinary
inquiry (here, described as 10 years or more), it could
also be argued that the methodology is progressively
moving towards the ‘integration’ end of the spectrum, as
the research project increasingly considered questions
that are not strictly ‘related to or affected by the law’.26
2 Independent Accountability
Mechanisms at Multilateral
Development Banks, in
Transnational Regulatory
Governance Context
The development-lending operations of multilateral
development banks are described as a form of transna-
tional regulatory governance for a number of reasons – a
few of which will be highlighted here. For example,
23. See e.g. B. van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law and Method: Interdis-
ciplinary Research into Law (2011), at 10-13. The authors present a
‘dynamic model of interdisciplinarity’ that can be described in terms of a
continuum – at one end, ‘heuristic’ approaches, followed by ‘auxiliary’
and ‘comparative’ approaches, ‘perspectivist’ and, at the other end of
the spectrum, ‘integrated’ approaches.
24. Id.
25. See e.g. D.W. Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’, 31
Journal of Law and Society 163 (2004), at 184-5: ‘[a]t one end is
research that attempts to answer what are essentially doctrinal ques-
tions about legal rules or proposed law reforms by using, in part, infor-
mation gained from other disciplines’ whereas ‘[a]t the opposite end
[…] would be research that merges the questions asked and assump-
tions made by different disciplines so completely that potentially an
entirely new discipline could emerge.’ An ‘intermediate approach’,
which this research methodology is arguably an example of, ‘appl[ies]
the method or theoretical constructs of a different discipline to legal
materials or aspects of a legal system in order to study social phenom-
ena related to or affected by the law’ (Id.). For a description of this
research methodology in terms of Siems’ ‘taxonomy’, see Siems, above
n. 1.
26. See Vick, above n. 25, at 184-5; and see van Klink and Taekema, above
n. 23, at 13 (arguing that ‘integrated’ legal-interdisciplinary approaches
are ‘categorized by the fact that the research process itself contains ele-
ments from [law and non-legal] disciplines and the researcher welds
together the concepts and methods from each or applies a more gener-
al methodological approach to both’.)
MDB development-lending operations27 involve a wide
range of state and non-state actors – including individu-
als (‘project-affected people’)28 – participating (in vari-
ous capacities) in the activities, governance structures,
and processes surrounding development projects
financed (or co-financed) by MDBs. These activities,
structures, and processes, in turn, cut across the inter-
national, regional, national as well as sub-national
(‘local’) levels. In addition, MDB development-lending
operations involve various (intersecting) normative sys-
tems that are both legal and non-legal (‘social’) in
nature,29 which also operate at (and, as some argue,
across) the international, regional, national, and sub-
national (‘local’) levels.30
Different forms of transnational regulatory governance,
moreover, share core characteristics. These include, for
example, a shift from formal to informal governance and
regulatory arrangements, structures, and processes –
which means that the distinction between what is con-
sidered ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ often becomes ambigu-
ous.31 In addition, conventional systems of categorisa-
tion that have long been employed to differentiate
between, for instance, different types of actors and func-
tions (‘public’ versus ‘private’ sector), levels of gover-
nance (‘international’ versus ‘national’), and types of
normative systems (non-legal (‘social’) versus ‘legal’),
tend to lose their functional value when employed in
transnational regulatory governance contexts.32 As a
result of this ‘flattening of the difference between vari-
ous categories’, ‘a multitude of formal and informal con-
nections [are] taking the place of what once were rela-
tively clear rules and categories’.33
Characteristics such as these have various consequences.
Of particular significance from a political-legal perspec-
27. Note: MDB development-lending operations include the activities
involved in a typical ‘project cycle’ of MDB-financed development proj-
ects, situated in MDB borrower-member states. An MDB project cycle
usually consists of the following stages: project identification, project
design and appraisal, approval and financing, project implementation,
closure and post-implementation review. See e.g. the World Bank’s
project cycle, available at: <http:// go. worldbank. org/ DT9OOK71V0>
(last visited 30 October 2015). Examples of prominent MDBs include
the World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA, and ICSID), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IABD), Asian Development Bank (ADB),
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the
African Development Bank (AfDB). For examples of different forms of
transnational regulatory governance, see in general T. Hale and D. Held
(eds.), Handbook of Transnational Governance (2011); and K.E. Davis,
A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury & S. Engle Merry (eds.), Governance by Indica-
tors: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (2012).
28. I.e. a term of art used in MDB development-lending operations, refer-
ring to individuals affected by the design and implementation of an
MDB-financed development project. Note, this impact might be posi-
tive, where these individuals stand to benefit from the project (in which
case they would also be referred to as ‘project beneficiaries’); or nega-
tive, where the project is (likely) to result in adverse environmental,
economical or social effects within the project area.
29. And see above n. 11.
30. On the phenomenon of intersecting normative systems in an emerging
‘postnational’ legal and political order, see in general Krisch, above n. 2.
31. See Von Bogdandy et al., above n. 2, at 7 and 9. For criticism of the
‘growing use of non-formal law-ascertainment criteria’, see D’Aspre-
mont, above n. 12, at 221-3.
32. Krisch, above n. 2, at 4.
33. Id.
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tive, for example, are the resulting challenges of identi-
fying ‘unilateral’ or ‘non-authoritative acts’.34 In the
context of MDB development-lending operations –
where ‘public authority’35 or power is exercised by
international organisations (the MDBs), MDB-donor
and borrower states, as well as by the public and private
sector (and, on occasion, civil society) entities acting as
project implementing agencies – the challenges involv-
ing the identification of ‘non-authoritative’ acts and the
attribution of accountability (not to mention, of legal lia-
bility and responsibility),36 are exacerbated by the fact
that MDBs have steadily increased the scope of their
development agendas over the past decades.37
Moreover, as Klabbers points out, the exercise of public
authority by a wide range of actors ‘can also take on all
sorts of legal and quasi-legal forms’.38 And, while this
‘process of ‘legal pluralization’ is underway in various
manifestations (diffusion of actors as well as forms)’, it is
also ‘accompanied by a broader normative pluralization’
– which results in a situation where ‘it is no longer
immediately evident (presuming it ever was) that legal
authority is the sort of authority to strive for’.39 Hence,
as Kingsbury comments, ‘[l]aw contributes appreciably,
but generally only in limited ways, alongside political,
economic, social, and historical factors
… in explaining why certain institutions exist in the
global administrative space with particular member-
ships and structures, why these have the mandates
and decision rules they do, and why other institu-
tions, mandates, or rules do not exist.40
34. Von Bogdandy et al., above n. 2, at 4.
35. Von Bogdandy et al., above n. 2, at 5 (arguing that ‘any kind of gover-
nance activity by international institutions,’ ‘be it administrative or inter-
governmental, should be considered as an exercise of international pub-
lic authority if it determines individuals, private associations, enterprises,
states, or other public institutions’. (Emphasis in original.)
36. On the distinction between these concepts, see e.g. the conceptual
work of the International Law Association (ILA) on the accountability of
international organisations (IOs). The ILA describes different forms (e.g.
political, legal, administrative, financial) and levels of IO-accountability,
i.e.: first level: various ‘forms of internal and external scrutiny and moni-
toring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and/or responsi-
bility’; second level: ‘tortious liability for injurious consequences arising
out of acts or omissions not involving a breach of any rule of interna-
tional and/or institutional law’; and third level: ‘responsibility arising out
of acts or omissions which do constitute a breach of a rule of interna-
tional and/or institutional law.’ (See International Law Association,
Report of the Seventy First Conference, Berlin (2004), available at:
<http:// www. ila -hq. org/ en/ publications/ order -reports. cfm>, at 5-6
(last visited 31 October 2015)). Note, IAM-practice would constitute an
example of ‘first level accountability’ that combines various forms of
accountability.
37. See e.g. in general J.W. Head, ‘For Richer or for Poorer: Assessing the
Criticisms Directed at the Multilateral Development Banks’, 52 The Uni-
versity of Kansas Law Review, 241 (2003-2004); and D.D. Bradlow and
C. Grossman, ‘Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New
Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF’, 17 Human Rights Quarter-
ly 411 (1995).
38. J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters, & G. Ulfstein,
The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009) 12, at 12-4.
39. Id.
40. See Kingsbury, above n. 15.
Or, as Orford argues, ‘a renewed public interest in cos-
mopolitan legality’ transpired ‘at the same moment as a
perceived crisis of relevance [of] existing international
law and institutions’.41 In other words, the ‘questions to
which international law is expected to offer an answer’ –
including the accountability, legal liability, and respon-
sibility of international organisations – ‘are some of the
most important, vital and intriguing questions of our
time’; yet, there is a persistent perception that ‘interna-
tional law as a discipline has lost its capacity to provide a
compelling understanding of what is at stake when these
questions arise’.42 This conundrum compels interna-
tional legal scholars, aided by the theories and methods
from non-legal disciplines, to ‘think about what happens
to law at the limits of modern political organization’.43
2.1 MDB Responses to Concerns about
Accountability: The Operational Policies
and Citizen-Driven IAMs
Over the past few decades, MDBs, with the World Bank
Group blazing the trail, have responded to concerns
about their accountability in a number of ways.44
Notably, MDBs have established internal normative
frameworks to guide their development-lending opera-
tions. These operational policy frameworks incorporate
informal best practices (norms that are recommended but
not obligatory) as well as formal operational policies and
procedures (norms that are compulsory for MDB man-
agement and staff, and, to the extent that these norms
are incorporated in the credit/loan agreement, also for
borrowers).45 A critical part of these operational policy
frameworks includes the safeguard policies, which are
41. See Orford, above n. 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Note, another prominent response not discussed here concerns reforms
of MDB governance structures – in this regard, see e.g. N. Woods,
‘Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable’, 77 Interna-
tional Affairs 1, 83 (2001); Head, above n. 37; and see D.D. Bradlow,
‘The Reform of the Governance of the IFIs: A Critical Assessment’, in H.
Cissé, D.D. Bradlow & B. Kingsbury (eds.), The World Bank Legal
Review: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Gover-
nance (2011), e-Book.
45. For a comparative overview and analysis of World Bank (IDA and IBRD)
and IFC operational policies, see e.g. D. Bradlow and A. Naudé Fourie,
‘The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International
Finance Corporation Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed Institu-
tions?’, 10 International Organizations Law Review 3 (2014), at 3-80.
For a discussion of how the MDBs incorporate their operational policies
as ‘conditionalities’ in the credit/loan agreement, see e.g. L. Boisson de
Chazournes, ‘Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank Opera-
tional Standards’, in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance
(2000) 281, at 289-90. Note, a credit/loan agreement entered between
an MDB and a borrower member state is an international agreement
(between an international organisation and a state), governed by inter-
national law – see e.g. D.D. Bradlow, ‘International Law and the Opera-
tions of the International Financial Institutions’, in D.D. Bradlow and
D.B. Hunter (eds.), International Financial Institutions and International
Law (2010) 1, at 11; and see D.A. Wirth, ‘Commentary: Compliance
with Non-Binding Norms of Trade and Finance’, in D. Shelton (ed.),
Commitment and Compliance (2000) 330, at 334.
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aimed specifically at managing environmental, social,
and economic risks.46
The ‘legal nature’ of these operational policy frame-
works remains a point of contention. Generally speak-
ing, internal (‘institutional’) stakeholders argue that
operational policies and procedures are internal docu-
ments with no legal features,47 while external (‘public’)
stakeholders assert that these norms are becoming or
have become a ‘form of particularly potent institutional
law’.48 Bradlow and Hunter conclude, for example, that
the MDBs’ operational policies and procedures ‘at least’
establish
a soft ‘lex speciali’ to govern their own operations in
regard to their Member States. As [the MDBs]
implement this soft law, it has the potential to raise
expectations among the stakeholders in these opera-
tions who begin to expect the [MDBs] to comply
with this soft law in their operation and to anticipate
that they can hold the [MDBs] to account if they fail
to comply with them … .49
A second response, which is of particular significance
for this discussion, concerns the establishment of inde-
pendent accountability mechanisms. These bodies are
mandated to enforce the relevant operational policy
frameworks and, through their functions of fact-finding,
problem-solving, compliance review, policy advice, and
monitoring, to strengthen the MDBs’ management and
governance structures.50
What makes these bodies unique, however, is the fact
that they are citizen-driven – that is, they are mandated
(usually, by the MDB’s Board of Executive Directors)
to receive claims directly from project-affected people
and/or their authorised (civil society) representatives,
concerning claims of actual or potential harm suffered as
a result of the MDB’s non-compliance with the relevant
operational policy framework.51
In other words, the IAMs also provide affected individ-
uals with an avenue of recourse as well as (at least) the
potential for redress.52 Before the establishment of the
46. For a discussion of the ‘evolution’ of the World Bank’s safeguard poli-
cies as the embodiment of the Bank’s ‘environmental and socially sus-
tainable mandate,’ see D. Freestone, The World Bank and Sustainable
Development (2013), at 9-16, and 63-71.
47. See e.g. I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice
(2000), at 41-9; and see S. Schlemmer-Schulte, ‘The World Bank
Inspection Panel: A Record of the First International Accountability
Mechanism and Its Role for Human Rights’, 6 Human Rights Brief 1, at
1 (1999).
48. See J. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2005), at
235.
49. See Bradlow, above n. 45, at 26; Wirth, above n. 45, at 333-7; and see
L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: About
Public Participation and Dispute Settlement’, in T. Treves, M. Frigessi di
Rattalma, A. Tanzi, A. Fodella, C. Pitea & C. Ragni (eds.), Civil Society,
International Courts and Compliance Bodies (2005) 187, at 191-2. For
a discussion of the inclusion of international legal standards in the IFC’s
operational policies, see e.g. D. Bradlow and M. Chapman, ‘Public Par-
ticipation and the Private Sector: The Role of Multilateral Development
Banks and the Evolving Legal Standards’, 4 Erasmus Law Review 89
(2011).
50. For a discussion of the entire range of internal accountability mecha-
nisms at the World Bank, see e.g. Shihata, above, n. 47, at 8-15.
World Bank’s Inspection Panel in 1993,53 project-affec-
ted people, who are in a ‘non-contractual relationship’
with MDBs, had no form of recourse or redress against
MDBs in instances where they have allegedly suffered
actual or potential harm due to MDB actions or inac-
tions.54 The establishment of IAMs placed individuals –
for the first time in the history of public international
law – in a ‘legally relevant relationship’ vis-à-vis an
international organisation.55
That being said, the ‘non-judicial’ versus ‘quasi-judicial’
nature of these bodies remains a point of contention –
and is also related to debate about the legal nature of the
MDBs’ operational policy frameworks.56 The MDBs
typically emphasise the non-judicial nature of these
51. See e.g. Inspection Panel Resolution (1993). Resolution No. IBRD
93-10/Resolution No. IDA 93-6, The World Bank Inspection Panel, 22
September 1993, para. 12. The World Bank’s operational policy frame-
work forms the Panel’s only basis for review, and ‘[f]or purposes of this
Resolution, ‘operational policies and procedures’ consist of the Bank’s
[binding] Operational Policies, Bank Procedures and Operational Direc-
tives, and similar documents issued before these series were started,
and does not include [non-binding] Guidelines and Best Practices and
similar documents or statements’. All World Bank operational policies
and procedures are available at: <http:// www. worldbank. org/
opmanual/> (last visited 31 October 2015).
52. Note, IAM-procedures can also be triggered from within the MDB (e.g.
by an Executive Board member, or by the MDB president); however,
IAM-practice consists almost entirely of claims filed by external parties.
53. For a history of the Inspection Panel’s establishment, the first IAM of
this kind, and which establishment led to similar developments at other
MDBs, see e.g. Shihata, above, n. 47. For a comparative functional
overview of prominent IAMs at MDBs, see e.g. D. Bradlow and A.
Naudé Fourie, ‘Independent Accountability Mechanisms at International
and Regional Development Banks’, in T.N. Hale and D. Held (eds.),
Handbook of Innovations in Transnational Governance (2011), at 122.
54. Note, this situation is the result of structural deficiencies in the interna-
tional legal system that are not easily remedied, i.e.: the (qualified)
immunity of international institutions before domestic courts; limitations
of legal standing before international judicial tribunals; and prevailing
ambiguity about the international legal obligations of international
organisations. In this regard, see e.g. D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter
(eds.), International Financial Institutions and International Law
(2010), at xxv-xxix and 387-97. For a critical analysis of the immunity
of international institutions before domestic courts, see e.g. A. Reinisch,
International Organization before National Courts (2008). On the limi-
tations of the international legal system in providing legal recourse and
redress to individuals in a non-contractual relationship with international
institutions, see in general J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis & P. Schmitt
(eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International
Organisations (2010).
55. See E. Hey, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition
of a New Legally Relevant Relationship in International Law’, 2 The
Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium 61 (1997), at 61.
56. MDBs are concerned that claims filed at the IAMs might be used as a
basis for challenging their qualified immunity before domestic courts –
as had occurred in at least one (unsuccessful) instance in the institution-
al history of the World Bank Inspection Panel – see e.g. Shihata’s com-
ments about the Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretá case, above n. 47, at
122-4; and see Shihata’s argument (Id., at 234) that ‘a violation by the
Bank of its policy, even if established by the [Inspection] Panel is not
necessarily a violation of applicable law that entails liability for ensuing
damages; and … since the Panel is not a court of law, its findings on
Bank violations cannot be taken ipso facto as a conclusive evidence
against the Bank in [domestic] judicial proceedings’. Note, Ibrahim Shi-
hata was a former World Bank Vice President and Group Legal Counsel.
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mechanisms,57 whereas academic commentators
(including this author) tend to view IAMs as ‘hybrid’
mechanisms with certain court-like features.58
As the growing number of different IAMs investigated a
slowly but steadily increasing number of cases,59
researchers in the areas of public international law and
political science underlined the potential for normative
development – emanating from the ‘dispute resolution
triad’ formed by the claimants, MDB management (the
‘respondents’), and the IAM (with the MDB’s Board of
Executive Directors usually acting as final arbiter).60
Studying the practice of IAMs, therefore, could yield
significant insights as to the content and scope of the
international legal responsibilities of MDBs, which
remain an ambiguous area.61
It could also help to clarify the place of law in transna-
tional regulatory governance contexts because, while the
57. See e.g. Schlemmer-Schulte, above n. 47, arguing that the ‘implemen-
tation of the Bank’s policy standards in projects does not result in sub-
stantive rights that individuals in borrowing countries may claim against
the Bank, nor does the Inspection Panel represent a legal remedy mech-
anism through which positions described in the Bank’s policies or rights
referred to in the Resolution could be enforced against the Bank’. Note,
the author was Senior Counsel and Associate General Counsel/Special
Advisor to the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World
Bank, between 1995 and 2002. Also see M. Hansungule, ‘Access to
Panel – The Notion of Affected Party, Issues of Collective and Material
Interest’, in G. Alfredsson and R. Ring (eds.), The Inspection Panel of
the World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure (2001) 143, com-
menting (at 150) that while the Panel is clearly ‘not a court of law and
not even like a court of law’, it is nevertheless significant that the Panel
as well as ‘Bank officials frequently like to stress this point as if to prove
that it is in fact a kind of a court of law. The fact that it is not a court of
law or like a court is sometimes denied so often by Bank staff as to sug-
gest that this was in fact the idea behind its establishment’.
58. See e.g. L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Compliance with Operational Stan-
dards – The Contribution of the World Bank Inspection Panel’, in G.
Alfredsson and R. Ring (eds.), The Inspection Panel of the World Bank:
A Different Complaints Procedure (2001) 67, at 83-4; B. Kingsbury,
‘Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of the Law-
Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples’, in G.S.
Goodwin-Gill and S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality of International Law:
Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (1999) 323, at 332; K. Nathan, ‘The
World Bank Inspection Panel: Court or Quango?’, 12 Journal of Inter-
national Arbitration 135, at 137-8; and see in general A. Naudé Fourie,
The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight: In
Search of the ‘Judicial Spirit’ in Public International Law (2009). For a
discussion of how IAMs fit into Romano’s ‘taxonomy’ of international
rule of law bodies, see C.P.R. Romano, ‘A Taxonomy of International
Rule of Law Institutions’, 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement
241, at 247 (2011). But also see M. Van Putten, Policing the Banks:
Accountability Mechanisms for the Financial Sector (2008), at xxiii.
Van Putten (a non-lawyer and former Inspection Panel member) con-
siders the fact that ‘most studies about accountability mechanisms,
compliance mechanisms, and review panels – and more specifically the
Inspection Panel – have been done by lawyers’, as both ‘a hindrance
and challenge’. (Id.)
59. For a statistical overview of cases filed at different IAM, see e.g. A.
Naudé Fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel Casebook (2014), at
604.
60. See in general Kingsbury, above n. 58; see Bradlow and Naudé Fourie,
above n. 45, at 59-62; Bradlow and Hunter, above n. 54, at 395-6; and
see E. Suzuki and S. Nanwani, ‘Responsibility of International Organiza-
tions: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral Development
Banks’, 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 177 (2005-2006), at
225. On normative development occurring as a ‘by-product’ of ‘triadic
dispute resolution’, see in general M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, On
Law, Politics, and Judicialization (2002).
61. See Bradlow and Hunter, above, n. 54, at xxv-xxix and 387-97.
contribution of legal normativity may have been limited
in the past, as Kingsbury argues, ‘the roles of law are of
rapidly growing in importance’ since ‘the stakes
involved in [transnational regulatory governance]
regimes are high.’62 Indeed, ‘[n]ew understandings of
law and its roles are emerging’63 in part because interna-
tional organisations ‘have increasingly sought to shore
up their legitimacy, and to enhance the effectiveness of
their regulatory activities, by applying to (and between)
themselves procedural norms,’ including ‘transparency,
participation, reasoned decision making, … legality, and
[the establish[ment] [of] mechanisms of review and
accountability’.64
3 The Research Project and Its
Underlying Methodology
The IAM-practice research project (‘project’), therefore,
set off by addressing legal questions.65 The project’s ini-
tial ‘dynamic hypothesis’66 argued that there is a func-
tional equivalence between judicial institutions executing
mandates of judicial review and citizen-driven IAMs at
MDBs executing mandates of fact-finding and compliance
review.
This dynamic hypothesis provides the first hint of the
place legal doctrinal methods came to occupy in the
project’s research methodology. If IAMs, reviewing the
actions and omissions of MDBs against the normative
framework constituted by the operational policies and
procedures, are likened to courts executing mandates of
judicial review, it would make sense to employ the same
interpretative techniques and schemes used by judges
and employed in ‘legal [doctrinal] scholarship’.67
But the need for employing a legal-interdisciplinary
approach also became clear during the early stages of the
project. In fact, this need was illustrated quite forcibly
by a cursory analysis of IAM-practice material, which
demonstrates, for instance, that MDB development-
lending operations cut across various disciplinary areas
and practice domains. Moreover, the notion of ‘account-
ability’ is multifaceted and different disciplines tend to
62. See Kingsbury, above n. 15.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Note, the project started in 2005 as a masters-level dissertation, expan-
ded into a doctoral research project in 2007, and continued as a post-
doctoral research project during 2009-2015.
66. A ‘dynamic hypothesis’, which is informed by theory and observations
drawn from practice, ‘supports and informs’ inquiry; but it does not
treat theory ‘as an illusive, sacred Truth’. (See M. Shields and N. Ran-
garajan, A Playbook for Research Methods: Integrating Conceptual
Frameworks and Project Management (2013), at 1-11.) In this project,
various dynamic hypotheses have been reflected as conceptual models
(as illustrated in Section 3) that serve as ‘useful tool[s] that organiz[e]
inquiry connecting problem and data’. (Id., at 23-4.)
67. See Vranken, above n. 8, at 43-4.
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emphasise different aspects thereof.68 Hence, the project
concluded that the issue of ‘MDB-accountability’ needs
to be addressed by means of a legal-interdisciplinary
approach. As the ILA argues, IO-accountability is ‘not a
notion which, for the sake of its operationality, is or has
to be viewed as monolithic, calling for uniform and
indiscriminate application’.69 Simply put, ‘such rigidity
would not survive the complexities of international real-
ity’.70 Instead, our efforts to conceptualise and opera-
tionalise the accountability of international organisations
have to maintain the ‘delicate balance’
between preserving the necessary autonomy in deci-
sion-making for … [international institutions] and
responding to the need, both in the sphere of interna-
tional law and international relations, to have these
actors accountable for their acts and omissions.71
As the research project proceeded, it became increasing-
ly clear that IAM-practice provides a unique window
onto MDB development-lending operations that might
also facilitate inquiry into matters that are not ‘entirely
legal’, or that are merely ‘law related’. For instance,
IAM-practice demonstrates the complex dynamics
between MDBs, borrowers, and project implementing
agencies; the intricate trade-off decisions involved in
‘balancing’ economic, social, and environmental inter-
ests in order to realise the sustainable development
objectives; as well as the tension among institutional
performance areas aimed at meeting commercial objec-
tives and those aimed at public objectives, including the
avoidance and mitigation of social and environmental
‘harm’ or material adverse effects.
Interdisciplinary researchers are familiar with the chal-
lenges involving integration – that is, how do you fit dif-
ferent types of methods, theories, and research ques-
tions into a methodology so that it is not only coherent,
but also so that its different components work together
68. See e.g. R. Mulgan, ‘Accountability’: An Ever-expanding Concept?’, 78
Public Administration 555, at 555 (2000); and see J. Fox, ‘Introduction:
Framing the Inspection Panel’, in D. Clark, J. Fox & K. Treakle (eds.),
Demanding Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank
Inspection Panel (2003) xi, at xii, arguing that accountability is an
‘inherently relational’ concept and its ‘meaning [therefore] varies greatly
depending on the actors involved (for example, contractual, corporate,
and political accountability are all quite different).’ As for ‘[t]he stan-
dards themselves’, that is, ‘what counts as compliance’, Fox argues that
both ‘the scope and meaning of public accountability more generally,
are all contested and shaped through political conflict.’ (Id., emphasis in
original.)
69. International Law Association, Report of the Sixty Eighth Conference,
Taipei (1998), available at: <http:// www. ila -hq. org/ en/ publications/
order -reports. cfm>, at 15-7 (last visited 31 October 2015). Also see
Bradlow and Hunter, above n. 54, at 81.
70. Id.
71. International Law Association, Report of the Seventy First Conference,
Berlin, (2004), available at: <http:// www. ila -hq. org/ en/ publications/
order -reports. cfm>, at 5-6 (last visited 31 October 2015). On IO-
accountability as a multifaceted concept, also see e.g. E. Brown Weiss,
‘On Being Accountable in a Kaleidoscopic World’, 104 American Soci-
ety of International Law Proceedings 477, at 480 (2010).
in such a way that the total can indeed be more – and
‘more interesting’ – than the sum of its parts?72
In this project, two (closely related) mechanisms facili-
tate such integration: conceptual models73 (discussed in
Section 4) and the IAM-practice database (‘database’),
which will be introduced in the remainder of this sec-
tion.
3.1 The IAM-Practice Database
The IAM-practice database74 provides the project’s ana-
lytical platform. It consists of five components, contain-
ing different types of data:75
1. A comparative institutional and functional overview
of IAM-mandates, functions, compositions, operat-
ing processes and procedures, as well as MDB
operational policies. This component facilitates
contextualisation, which is a critical analytical com-
ponent during the initial stages of interdisciplinary
and comparative research projects.76
2. A quantitative overview, which supports descriptive
statistical analyses of various quantifiable aspects –
concerning, for instance, MDB development-lend-
ing operations and claims filed at the IAMs.77
3. A descriptive IAM-case overview, which provides a
structured summary of all individual claims
(‘cases’) filed at the IAMs – setting out key aspects
72. See Brewer, above n. 20. On challenges involving legal-interdisciplinary
approaches, see e.g. Vick, above n. 25, at 185; and see in general
Siems, above n. 1. Also see Hirsch Hadorn et al., above n. 19, at 443-8.
73. Conceptual models employed in legal scholarship have been described
as ‘neutral reference system[s] in the form of concepts’ or ‘abstract
models derived in an inductive process from specific instances of real-
existing law’ (see O. Brand, ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a
Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies’, 32 Brooklyn
Journal of International Law 405, at 436 (2007); and in other research
contexts it has been described as ‘system[s] of concepts, assumptions,
expectations, beliefs, and theories that suppor[t] and informs your
research’ (see J. Maxwell, ‘Designing a Qualitative Study’, in L. Bickman
and D. Rog (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Applied Social Research
Methods (2009), at 222); or, as ‘the way ideas are organized to achieve
a research project’s purpose’ (see Shields and Rangarajan, above n. 66,
at 24).
74. Database, as defined here, refers to a repository of various types of
information (‘data’) that is organised in such a way so as to ensure ‘ease
and speed of search and retrieval’ (see <http:// www. thefreedictionary.
com/ database> (last visited 31 October 2015)).
75. Data is defined here as different types of ‘[f]acts that can be analyzed
or used in an effort to gain knowledge or make decisions’ (see <http://
www. thefreedictionary. com/ data> (last visited 31 October 2015)).
76. Note, the data included in this component has been collected and con-
figured by comparative (constitutional) law and legal doctrinal methods.
On the importance of contextualisation in comparative legal studies, see
e.g. A. Peters and H. Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law beyond Post-Mod-
ernism’, 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 800, at
801-802 (2000); and see T. Koopmans, Courts and Political Institu-
tions: A Comparative View (2003), at 96-7. On the role of contextuali-
sation in developing an understanding of the ‘relevant complexity of a
problem’ in interdisciplinary or ‘transdisciplinary problem-oriented’
research, see Hirsch Hadorn et al., above n. 19, at 441.
77. Note, the data included in this component has been collected and con-
figured by means of descriptive (as opposed to predictive or inferential)
statistical methods. Descriptive statistics ‘summarize the information in a
collection of data’, whereas inferential statistics ‘provide predictions
about a population, based on data from a sample of that population’.
See A. Agresti and B. Finlay, Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences
(2009), at 4. For examples of how this data has been employed, see
Naudé Fourie, above n. 58, at 566-604.
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of the case and covering each stage of the IAM-pro-
cess.78
4. An indexed overview, consisting of recurring words
and phrases in IAM-practice material (such as
‘environmental impact assessment’, ‘indigenous
people’, ‘poverty reduction’, and ‘hydro-electric
power facility’).79
5. A qualitative overview, consisting of recurring
themes, problems – issues – extracted from IAM-
practice material (such as the ‘definition of indige-
nous people’, the meaning of ‘free and informed
participation of indigenous peoples’, the ‘identifica-
tion and quantification of project-affected people’,
and the ‘diligent consideration of design alterna-
tives’.
With the exception of component (2), which contains
numeric data, the data in components (1), (3), (4), and
(5) are text, sourced from: (1) MDB project documenta-
tion that is in the public domain;80 (2) MDB operational
policies;81 and (3) IAM-practice material.82 What fur-
ther distinguishes component (5) is the fact that it
involves a significant degree of interpretation. Hence, as
Section 3 will discuss in more detail, legal doctrinal
analysis played a prominent role in collecting and con-
figuring the data contained in the issue overview (compo-
nent (5)).
Furthermore, components (1), (2), (3), and (4) reflect a
‘data-driven’ (or, ‘bottom-up’) approach – meaning, the
database design has been influenced by the structure,
format, and content of the data; whereas data collection
and configuration involved the systematic processing of
all data, recording only what has been identified.
A data-driven approach might therefore be compared to
the proverbial search through a haystack – without,
however, being given detailed instructions to find a nee-
dle, but simply to record all findings and place (‘config-
ure’) them in appropriate data categories and sub-cate-
gories (e.g. ‘hay’ [‘short’, ‘medium’, and ‘long stubs’],
‘needles’, and ‘insects’ [‘ants’, ‘crickets’, and ‘grasshop-
pers’]).
Component (5), by contrast, reflects a ‘hypothesis-driv-
en’ (or, ‘top-down’) approach – meaning, a particular
dynamic hypothesis (which, in terms of this project has,
78. For examples of how this data has been employed, see in general
Naudé Fourie, above n. 58.
79. Note, the data collection process involved in this component have been
partly automated; however, because of inconsistencies in the way ter-
minology is used across the different IAMs and MDBs, and also due to
the continuous institutional evolution of the IAMs, data has mostly
involved ‘human indexing’ techniques. On the differences between
‘human’ and ‘automated’ indexing, see e.g. J.D. Anderson and J. Perez-
Carballo, ‘The Nature of Indexing: How Humans and Machines Analyze
Messages and Texts for Retrieval’, 37 Information Processing and Man-
agement 231 (2001).
80. See e.g. the World Bank’s project repository, at: <http:// www.
worldbank. org/ projects> (last visited 31 October 2015).
81. See e.g. the EBRD’s operational policies at: <http:// www. ebrd. com/
what -we -do/ strategies -and -policies. html> (last visited 31 October
2015).
82. See e.g. the IFC/MIGA’s Compliance Advisory Ombudsman’s cases at:
<http:// www. cao -ombudsman. org/ cases/> (last visited 31 October
2015).
as noted, been expressed as various conceptual mod-
els)83 informed the database design and facilitated the
data collection and configuration process.
To extend the earlier metaphor: the dynamic hypothesis
would inform and direct the inquiry to look for ‘needles
in particle areas of the hay stack’, whereas legal doctrinal
methods, as will be discussed in the remainder of the
article, would assist with the identification and categori-
sation (‘coding’) of collected data.84 In other words, by
employing legal doctrinal analysis, a ‘thin piece of bent
metal with one fairly sharp end’ might be located in the
haystack and, although the object would not conform to
‘conventional needle-design’, it could still be recorded
under a relevant category that reflects its functional
equivalence.
4 The Place of Legal Doctrinal
Analysis in Designing and
Developing the IAM-Practice
Database
Legal doctrinal analysis occupied a place of prominence
during the IAM-practice database’s design and develop-
ment stages – notably, with respect to the issue overview
component (5), which also forms the focus of the discus-
sion in this section.
4.1 Designing the Database: Legal Doctrinal
Analysis Supporting Conceptualisation
The database design stage consists of the following
activities: identifying potential data sources; analysing
the data format and content in the identified sources to
gain an understanding of how the data might support
different types of analyses; designing the data collection
process (i.e. determining what data would be extracted
from the identified sources, and how the data will be
extracted); designing the data categorisation or coding
process (i.e. deciding how the data will be categorised or
sorted within the database);85 designing the data configu-
ration process (i.e. determining how the data will be
recorded, identifying the relationships between data sets
and deciding how these relationships will be reflected
within the database;86 and designing the data testing pro-
83. See e.g. Figure 1, below.
84. See n. 85, below.
85. To this end, the project employs ‘issue classification’ methods such as
‘analytic coding’, which involves the process of classifying and catego-
rizing data – see e.g. C. Glesne, Becoming Qualitative Researchers
(2011), at 194-9.
86. Id.
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cess (i.e. determining what approach will be followed to
ensure data quality).87
Because the issue component of the database is hypothe-
sis-driven, the dynamic hypothesis plays a fundamental
role during the database design stage – especially with
regard to designing the data collection, categorisation,
and configuration processes. In order to do so, however,
the dynamic hypothesis has to be further conceptual-
ised.
For instance, the project’s core dynamic hypothesis con-
cerns, as noted, the functional equivalence between courts
executing a mandate of judicial review and IAMs executing
a mandate of fact-finding and compliance review. Howev-
er, the hypothesis would require a lower level of abstrac-
tion concerning the nature of such ‘functional equiva-
lence’ in order for it to ‘drive’ the activities of the data-
base design and development stages. Subsequently, the
project developed various conceptual models focusing
on the nature of (quasi-) judicial review (‘what it entails’
and, importantly, ‘how it is performed’), the outcomes in
which it results or to which it contributes, and the
dynamics between the (quasi-) judicial review body and
the ‘political organs’ (in national constitutional systems:
legislature, and executive; in the context of MDBs:
MDB management, and Executive Boards of Direc-
tors).88
The development of these conceptual models was facili-
tated by non-legal methods such as the modelling tech-
niques employed in systems thinking and systems
dynamics89 – in combination, however, with legal doc-
trinal and comparative constitutional methods. The
project employed these methods to analyse landmark
cases in a number of national and supranational consti-
tutional systems, as well as the dynamics between judi-
cial and political institutions;90 and, to analyse a subset
of IAM-practice material.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of one of the conceptu-
al models developed in this manner. The model posits
that (quasi-) judicial institutions assert and expand their
de facto independence and authority vis-à-vis political
institutions; but not indefinitely, as their actions are
bound to trigger factors limiting further assertion and
expansion (i.e. limiting ‘growth’) – such as ‘backlash’
from political institutions. On the other hand, the pro-
87. The project employs an approach that has been derived from ‘evolu-
tionary prototyping models’ developed in the context of information
technology (IT) design and implementation projects – see e.g. J.L. Brew-
er and K.C. Dittman, Methods of IT Project Management, 2nd edn.
(2008), e-Book: ‘Evolutionary prototyping models are initiated with ini-
tial planning and risk assessment, followed by the development of a
prototype, evaluation of the prototype – and iteration of this cycle as
often as required’.
88. See e.g. Naudé Fourie, above n. 58, at 33-56, 131-56 and 323-8. And
see in general A. Naudé Fourie, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel’s
Normative Potential: A Critical Assessment, and A Restatement’, LIX
Netherlands International Law Review 199 (2012).
89. E.g. ‘causal-loop diagrams’, ‘systems archetypes’, and ‘behavior-over-
time’ graphs – see in general J.D. Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems
Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (2000); and V. Anderson
and L. Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Casual
Loops (1997).
90. See Naudé Fourie, above n. 58, at 59-159.
longed stagnation or contraction of (quasi-) judicial
independence and authority are also bound to trigger
factors limiting further stagnation or retraction (i.e. lim-
iting ‘decline’) – such as ‘backlash’ from external actors
questioning the (quasi-) judicial institution’s credibility.
In this way, (quasi-) judicial institutions tend to fluctu-
ate between periods of activism and restraint, but their
survival ultimately requires expansion – albeit incre-
mental expansion – along the general line of progression.91
The project employed another type of conceptual tool,
the ‘issue tree’ – again, in combination with legal doctri-
nal and comparative constitutional analysis – to move
the conceptual model to even lower levels of abstraction
(thus, reflecting increasing degrees of detail and com-
plexity). An excerpt from the issue tree underlying the
(quasi-) judicial review model is illustrated by Figure 2.
Ultimately, the detailed issue tree underlying the (qua-
si-) judicial review model formed the basis for the
design of the issue-view component of the IAM-practice
database, with each ‘branch’ of the issue tree represent-
ing a distinct data category (or issue ‘code’).92
For example, the model conceptualises that (quasi-)
judicial institutions assert and expand their authority/
power vis-à-vis political institutions by developing and
employing ‘doctrines’, principled approaches, or inter-
pretative schemes – such as the margin of appreciation
doctrine developed by the European Court of Human
Rights.93 Where the (quasi-) judicial institution draw
this ‘margin’ in a particular case can either restrict or
expand political authority; however, the fact that it is
the (quasi-) judicial institution that reviews and affirms
where the margin should be drawn in particular instan-
ces illustrates that it is a form of ‘judicialization’ (here
defined as the assertion, expansion of (quasi-) judicial
authority vis-à-vis political institutions).94
Legal doctrinal analysis of MDB operational policy
frameworks and the initial data-subset of IAM-practice
material revealed that several operational policy provi-
sions provided for significant degrees of ‘professional
judgement’ or ‘managerial discretion’ in the application
91. Note, this reasoning is an example of the ‘limits to success’ systems
archetype – see e.g. Sterman, above n. 89, at 111-13; and see Ander-
son and Johnson, above n. 89, at 59.
92. Note, the issue-view component of the IAM-practice database currently
lists over 200 different ‘issue-codes’ or issue descriptors.
93. See e.g. Handyside v. United Kingdom, ECHR (1976), 1 EHRR 737.
Also see Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and
the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR
(2002); and Y. Shani, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doc-
trine in International Law?’, 16 European Journal of International Law
907 (2005).
94. See e.g. Kingsbury, above n. 58, at 332 (arguing that IAMs such as the
Inspection Panel are becoming ‘more like courts’ due to the ‘general
tendency toward ‘judicialization’, which often appears where a triangle
is formed between complainant, respondent, and institutional adjudica-
tor, sets up a natural dynamic for the panel to enhance its jurisprudence
and its own role, supported by legally oriented NGOs and potentially by
some sections of Bank staff whose work such an approach vindicates’.).
But see Hansungule, above n. 57, at 151.
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of the policies.95 Moreover, IAMs review the exercise of
such professional judgement or managerial discretion in
determining whether MDB actions or omissions consti-
95. See e.g. Bradlow and Naudé Fourie, above n. 45, at 30-6. Also see e.g.
the World Bank’s OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement), para. 9 and OP
4.10 (Indigenous Peoples), para. 20 – available at: <http:// www.
worldbank. org/ opmanual/> (last visited 31 October 2015).
tuted compliance with the relevant policy. Such reviews
often occur over the objection of MDB management,
who appears to argue either that, due to the intrinsic
nature of ‘discretion’, there can be no ‘margin’; or, that
it is up to MDB management alone to determine where
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Figure 2 The (quasi-) judicial review model – excerpt from ‘issue tree’
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such margins should be drawn.96 The analysis also
revealed that the IAMs tend to reject these arguments –
thereby asserting their authority to review the exercise
of professional judgement or managerial discretion and,
subsequently, allowing for broader or narrower ‘mar-
gins’, depending on the particular circumstances.97
In Uganda: Power Projects, for example, World Bank
management had determined that the Bank’s safeguard
policy on Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04) was not appli-
cable to the project because, although the project would
result in the ‘inundation of the Bujagali Falls’ (which
would admittedly be ‘destroy[ing] a natural habitat of
significance to the people of Uganda’), the project had
‘identif[ied] specific actions to offset this impact’.98
Hence, management concluded, the project would not
be ‘significantly converting or degrading a ‘critical natu-
ral habitat’ as defined in OP 4.04.’99
In interpreting the phrase, ‘in the Bank’s opinion’ (con-
tained in OP 4.04), the Inspection Panel acknowledged
that it indicated ‘the need for and importance of the
considered judgment of the Bank’ on the ‘crucial ques-
tion’ whether a project involved ‘significant conversion
or degradation of critical natural habitats’.100 However,
the Panel argued, the inclusion of this phrase in the pol-
icy did not
imply or give Management a blank check to apply or
not certain policy provisions to a specific project but
rather requires Management to form and provide
expressly an opinion on the issue in question, which
must be consistent with the objectives of the applica-
ble policy.101
The Panel subsequently allowed for a narrower margin
of appreciation when it concluded that the project’s
‘flooding of the Bujagali Falls area’ should have been
‘regarded as a critical natural habitat for purposes of OP
4.04’ since the policy ‘regards inundation as a form of
significant conversion or degradation’.102
4.2 Developing the Database: Legal Doctrinal
Analysis Supporting Data Collection and
Classification
The database development stage executes the activities
included in the processes of data collection, classification,
configuration, and testing – with respect to progressively
increasing datasets, until the entire dataset (i.e. of the
96. See e.g. Bradlow and Naudé Fourie, above n. 45, at 30-6.
97. Id. Also see Naudé Fourie (2012), above n. 88, at 208-10.
98. Uganda: Power Projects (2007), Inspection Panel, Investigation Report,
paras. 699 and 799. Note, World Bank OP 4.04 (Natural Habitats)
states: ‘… the Bank does not support projects that, in the Bank’s opin-
ion, involve the significant conversion or degradation of critical natural
habitats’ (emphases added). OP 4.04 is available at: <http:// www.
worldbank. org/ opmanual/> (last visited 31 October 2015). Also note,
all IAM-cases referenced in this article can be accessed via their respec-
ted websites – as listed above n. 4.
99. Id.
100. Uganda: Power Projects (2007), Inspection Panel, Investigation Report,
paras. 605-6.
101. Id.
102. Id.
IAM-practice material included in the project’s scope)
has been incorporated.103
Legal doctrinal analysis made significant contributions
with respect to the processes of data collection and cate-
gorisation (which, as noted earlier, involves assigning
the appropriate ‘issue-code’ or descriptor to an identi-
fied data entry).
As the project’s scope expanded, data collection and
configuration activities were executed through the col-
laborative effort of a small research team that included
legal researchers schooled in legal doctrinal analysis and
familiarised with the atypical legal content and format of
IAM-case material. At this point, the conceptual models
developed during the design stage with the assistance of
legal doctrinal analysis, also served to facilitate such col-
laboration.
In other words, as the research team systematically
worked through the source data (which, as noted, con-
sisted primarily of text) – guided by the dynamic
hypothesis and its supporting conceptual models – the
team could identify a potential data entry by employing
legal doctrinal analysis, even as it was not immediately
clear what the data entry signified, or with which issue-
code(s) the data entry should be configured within the
database.104 The team would regularly review recently
collected and configured data, which would not only
ensure data quality but would often also result in further
refinement of the conceptual model and the database
design.105 In this way, through the ‘shared surface’
offered by normativity, the team could interact by rea-
soning from and through the norms contained in the
data source material.106
To highlight one example, fairly early on during the
database development stage, a particular data entry from
the Inspection Panel’s China: Qinghai investigation was
identified and linked to the ‘margin of managerial dis-
cretion’ issue, discussed earlier. The data entry con-
cerned the World Bank’s application of its policies on
Environmental Assessment and Involuntary Resettle-
103. On the approach followed to ensure data quality, see above, n. 87.
Also note, the research project progressively expanded its scope by
including additional IAMs; however, the project included the entire
body of cases of IAMs in scope – as opposed to a data subset or selec-
ted cases.
104. Note, it is common for a data entry (i.e. an extract from IAM-practice
material) in the issue-component of the IAM-practice database to be
associated with multiple issue-codes due to the relationships among
various issues.
105. Note, the project adopted an approach by which the (initial) inclusion of
‘false positives’ was considered preferable above the exclusion of ‘false
negatives’ – i.e. when in doubt, a team member would include a data
entry and flag it for discussion; whereupon a final determination would
be made during the research team’s regular data review meeting.
106. Brunnée and Toope, above n. 16, at 7. And see Boisson de Chazournes,
above n. 49, at 187-8, arguing that the establishment of IAMs at MDBs
‘reflects the evermore urgent need to build ‘public spaces,’ in the mean-
ing attributed to that concept by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ –
i.e. public spaces that can facilitate the creation of ‘unusual connections
between partners of different stature, who need to exchange informa-
tion, work together and even negotiate’; and that citizen-driven can be
viewed as ‘a formalization of the type of interrelation contemplated by
Habermas’ model,’ because their practice ‘connects individuals with the
very core of the international decision-making process within this insti-
tution.’
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ment, with the Inspection Panel arguing that these poli-
cies could not
possibly be taken to authorize a level of ‘interpreta-
tion’ and ‘flexibility’ that would permit those who
must follow these [policies] to simply override the
portions of the [policies] that are clearly binding.107
Moreover, the Panel added, World Bank management
‘had an obligation’
to satisfy itself not only that the process and proce-
dures mandated by the policies had been followed,
but also that the work under review met professional-
ly acceptable standards of quality.108
‘In other words,’ the Panel concluded, ‘both process and
quality were essential components of compliance’.109
The Inspection Panel elaborated that a ‘process’
approach could mean that ‘even a one-page environ-
mental assessment of a major project could … be in
compliance if it passed the desks of, and was checked off
by, the appropriate persons at the appropriate times in
the decision process’.110
With this example at hand, data entries reflecting a sim-
ilar line of reasoning in Inspection Panel cases preceding
the 1999 Qinghai case were identified. In India: NTPC
Power, for instance, the Panel commented that the proj-
ect’s resettlement and rehabilitation components
‘appear[ed]’ to be compliant ‘at least on paper, with the
Bank’s [policy on Involuntary Resettlement] and were
[therefore] cleared by the Bank’s Legal Department and
Environmental Specialists’;111 however, because the
‘loan was processed so rapidly’, the Resettlement Action
Plans were only ‘completed immediately before the
project was presented to the Bank’s Board’ for appro-
val.112 Hence, the Panel concluded, ‘there was no time to
ensure that essential mechanisms and preconditions, such as
State Government commitment, capacity of implement-
ing agency, etc. were in place or adequate’.113
As the project progressed, more examples of this nature
were also identified in later Inspection Panel cases. For
example, in Colombia: Cartagena Water Project, con-
cerning the consideration of project design alternatives,
the Panel noted ‘that the appointment of a panel of
experts to review the technical work in the feasibility
study and the design of the Project [was] consistent with
Bank policies, particularly OD 4.01 paragraph 13,’ but
the Panel also commented that it was ‘not convinced
that there was a sufficiently thorough analysis of alterna-
tives before a decision on the [marine sewage] outfall was
107. China: Western Poverty Reduction Project (1999), Inspection Panel,
Investigation Report (Executive Summary), para. 11.
108. China: Western Poverty Reduction Project (1999), Inspection Panel,
Investigation Report, paras. 180-6.
109. Id.
110. Id., at para. 39.
111. India: NTPC Power Generation Project (1997), Inspection Panel, Inves-
tigation Report, para. 19 (emphasis added).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
made’.114 Whereas in Albania: Power Sector, on whether
two meetings held with project-affected people in 2003
could be considered as ‘the two EA [environmental
assessment] consultations required by the Bank for a
Category A [i.e. high risk] project’ (as argued by Bank
management), the Inspection Panel pointed out that
these meetings took place well after the borrower gov-
ernment ‘had approved the siting for the Project [con-
cerning the location construction of a thermal power
plant]’.115 ‘This form of EA consultation,’ the Panel
concluded, ‘created the appearance of consultation and
of consistency with the OP,’
but in reality was a ‘pro-forma move,’ not a genuine
consultation. [The two meetings] contributed nothing
to improving project selection, siting, planning or
design of the Project, and was not consistent with
timing required by the OP [4.01 on EA].116
By employing legal doctrinal analysis, the project came
to the conclusion that these examples were indicative of
a particular interpretive scheme developed and
employed by the Inspection Panel. An interpretative
scheme, in other words, that emphasises compliance with
both the procedural (process) and substantive (quality)
normative elements contained in the operational poli-
cies.
The project subsequently identified data entries that
demonstrate the normative development occurring as a
result of the Panel’s employment of this interpretative
scheme, as well as others – especially in areas concern-
ing access to information, participation in decision-mak-
ing, and access to justice, which, in turn, are critical for
the realisation of sustainable development and, argua-
bly, for ‘mainstreaming’ human rights in development
practice.117
Finally, by employing legal doctrinal methods in concert
with other conceptual and analytical tools, the project
114. Colombia: Cartagena Water Project (2004), Inspection Panel, Investiga-
tion Report, para. 77 (emphasis added).
115. Albania: Power Sector (2007), Inspection Panel, Investigation Report,
paras. 343-44. Also see e.g. India: Coal Sector (2001), Inspection Panel,
Investigation Report, paras. 348-9 (the Panel arguing that the project’s
Indigenous Peoples Development Plans were ‘disconnected, [had] little
depth, [were] just marginal and, on the whole, [did] not reflect a real
‘felt’ need’. E.g. the Panel expressed its concern ‘that there has been no
concentration on long-term projects such as literacy and numeracy
classes, maternal and child health, and self help groups’). And see India:
Mumbai Urban Transport (2004), Inspection Panel, Investigation
Report, para. 725 (the Panel noted that while Management had ‘early
on reminded the Borrower on the need to form and register [replace-
ment] housing cooperatives, it failed to adequately supervise this aspect
of the Project … in that it focused only on [the housing cooperatives’]
registration and did not consider their operational capacity and effec-
tiveness’).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. I.e. the so-called ‘Rio Declaration Principles’, as reflected in the declara-
tion adopted in 1992 during the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, see <http:// www. unep. org/ Documents.
multilingual/ Default. asp ?DocumentID= 78& ArticleID= 1163> (last access
ed 31 October 2015). On the relationship between public participation
and human rights protection see e.g. Bradlow and Chapman, above n.
49; and see the Inspection Panel’s comments in the Chad: Petroleum
case, below n. 124.
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identified various forms of normative development.118
Including, for instance, normative development that
strengthens the ‘obligatory nature’ of the operational
policies;119 enhances the degree of ‘precision’ or specif-
icity of ‘particular policies provisions’;120 clarifies, as
well as elaborate, on the relationship between MDB
operational policy frameworks and the international
legal system (for instance, by referencing international
legal standards, or by ‘reading’ certain international
legal standards ‘in’ (to) the policies);121 as well as a form
of normative development that links the restrictive or
restraining elements contained in the policies (such as
those aimed at avoiding or mitigating harm) to other ele-
ments aimed at enabling the realisation of particular
institutional aims.122
For example, as the IFC’s Compliance Advisory
Ombudsman Commented in Chile: Empresa Electrica
Pangue:
Business confidentiality is enshrined in IFC’s disclo-
sure policy. However, it may be interpreted expan-
sively or minimally. The CAO has been urged not to
judge the actions of IFC staff and management in the
early and mid ’90s by the standards of today, 2003.
But the discussion of disclosure relates to recent and
present activities. Communities consider that they
have the right to know if the World Bank Group is
exiting a deal, especially when they understand that
the exit is predicated upon conditions being met by
the sponsor that directly affect them. They want to
have access to independent monitoring and verifica-
tion reports of social and environmental issues which
directly concern and impact them. They have a right
to know the substance of negotiations that are being
undertaken on their behalf. They have a right to
know the operational and emergency planning that
may impact their lives and security. They have a
right to expect that a project of the World Bank
Group will at the very least protect them, to the
118. See Bradlow and Naudé Fourie, above n. 45, at 40-57. Note, data gath-
ered by employing legal doctrinal methods in concert with other con-
ceptual and analytical tools informed different conclusions about the
normative contribution of IAMs than those reached by international
legal scholars arguing that IAMs have not fulfilled their normative
potential. See e.g. C. Tan, ‘Mandating Rights and Limiting Mission
Creep: Holding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
Accountable for Human Rights Violations’, 2 Human Rights and Inter-
national Legal Discourse 97 (2008).
119. Id. Illustrated by examples from IAM-practice concerning the ‘margin of
managerial discretion’, noted earlier – see e.g. Indonesia: Wilmar Group
01 West Kalimantan (2007), Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Audit
Report, para. 2.8.3; and Bolivia: Comsur V-01 Bosque Chiquitano
(2003), Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Assessment Report, at 10.
120. Id. See e.g. Ecuador: Mining Development & Environmental Control
Technical Assistance Project (1999), Inspection Panel, Investigation
Report, paras. 52, 57 & 103; and see Peru Agrokasa-01/Ica (2009),
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Audit Report, para. 4.1.1.
121. Id.
122. See e.g. Paraguay/Argentina: Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project (2002),
Inspection Panel, Investigation Report, paras. 405 and 408, comment-
ing, with respect to its findings of significant non-compliance with the
Bank’s policy on Involuntary Resettlement, that the project ‘demon-
strate[d] that taking short-cuts with the Bank’s safeguard policies is
counterproductive for all concerned’ (emphasis added).
extent possible, from negative development impacts
and, where unintended impacts occur, that mitigation
measures are discussed and agreed with them. These
rights and issues of respect are not ones that evolve as
policies evolve; they are fundamental. They were in
1993, and they are in 2003. The policy framework
with which IFC works to ensure that they are upheld
has evolved, but IFC did not deal transparently with
the people affected by this project.123
Or, as the Inspection Panel argued in Chad: Petroleum,
‘[g]iven the world-wide attention to the human rights
situation in Chad … and the fact that this was an issue
raised in the request for inspection by a Requester’
who alleged that there were human rights violations
in the country, and that he was tortured because of
his opposition to the conduct of the project, the Panel
was obliged to examine the situation of human rights
and governance in the light of Bank policies. We are
convinced that the approach taken in our Report,
which finds human rights implicitly embedded in vari-
ous policies of the Bank, is within the boundaries of the
Panel’s jurisdiction. … Nevertheless, the Panel takes
issue with Management’s narrow interpretation of
the Bank’s position on human rights [i.e. that the
Bank’s mandate excluded civil and political rights; or
was limited to socio-economic rights]. … The Bank
policies on consultation, among others, presume a
basic respect for human rights. There was a period in
Chad when consultations with affected groups were
conducted in the presence of armed gendarmes. This
was hardly compatible with the Bank policies con-
cerned. … Mr. Chairman, perhaps this case should
lead the Board to study the wider ramifications of
human rights violations as these relate to the overall
success or failure of policy compliance in future Bank-
financed projects.124
Examples such as these demonstrate how law attains its
place in transnational regulatory governance contexts
through ‘thin’ (procedural) normative commitments (in
this instance, as represented by the MDBs’ adoption of
operational policies frameworks and their establishment
of citizen-driven IAMs to aid in the enforcement of
these frameworks) and also how law secures and
expands its place in these contexts by facilitating the
realisation of ‘thick’ (substantive) normative commit-
ments – notably, by means of the ‘dispute resolution tri-
ad’ formed between individual claimants, MDB Man-
agement (the ‘respondents’), and IAMs (with Executive
Board usually acting as final arbitral body).125
123. See Chile: Empresa Electrica Pangue SA 02 Upper Bio-Bio Watershed
(2002), Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Assessment Report, at 24
(emphasis added).
124. See Chad: Petroleum (2001), Inspection Panel, Inspection Panel Chair’s
Address to Board on occasion of Board’s adoption of the Panel’s Investi-
gation Report, para. 8 (emphases added.)
125. Brunnée and Toope, above n. 16, at 86; and see Shapiro and Stone
Sweet, above n. 60.
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5 Conclusion
Perhaps the first conclusion to be drawn from the expe-
riences with developing and deploying an advanced
legal-interdisciplinary methodology to study the prac-
tice of IAMs at MDBs – as discussed in this article – is
that they are not so different from the experiences of
‘conventional’ legal doctrinal research projects.
After all, most of the project’s source data is text (albeit
a-typical legal text), whereas the claims filed before
IAMs ‘arise out of the conflicts of social practice’,126 as
is true for legal cases, and the resolution of such claims
require the deployment of interpretative techniques and
principled or reasoned interpretative schemes similar to
those employed by courts.127
Moreover, once legal researchers overcome the meth-
odological obstacles presented by the particular format
and content of IAM-practice material – which include
an ambiguous and inconsistent use of legal terminology
(by claimants, MDB management, Board of Executive
Directors, and IAMs alike)128 – they intuitively know
‘what to do with the data’.129
In a way, these observations confirm Vick’s argument
that ‘[d]octrinalism’ or ‘the traditional doctrinal
approach to legal questions’ ‘remains the benchmark
against which legal academics define themselves and
their work’.130 It certainly served as ‘the point of depar-
ture’ for this project.131 The experiences with this proj-
ect also support Feldman’s argument that legal doctrinal
analysis is something that legal researchers ‘constantly’
and intuitively do.132 However, Feldman remains scepti-
cal of the value of employing non-legal methods, argu-
ing that legal-interdisciplinary researchers invariably
‘return to the well’ because they are ‘constantly disap-
pointed’ in ‘some new science’ that fails to ‘provide
answers to law’s dilemmas’.133
And this is probably where the experiences of this proj-
ect deviate most from those to which Feldman alludes.
Legal doctrinal methods occupy a prominent place
within this research methodology because they make a
distinct and significant contribution towards facilitating
inquiry as well as collaboration within the research
team. Legal doctrinal analysis certainly enabled the
126. S. Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy: A Characterisation of the Discipline of
Law’, in B. Van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law and Method: Interdis-
ciplinary Research into Law (2011), at 45 – noting that ‘[a]ll standard
sources for lawyers are texts’.
127. See e.g. Bradlow and Naudé Fourie, above n. 45, at 41-57.
128. Terms such as ‘rights’, ‘interests’, ‘legalistic’, ‘recourse’, ‘redress’, ‘reme-
dy’, and ‘jurisdiction’ are often employed in IAM-practice material with-
out any explanation as to their meaning; whereas legal doctrinal analy-
sis of data entries containing such terms often indicates that their mean-
ing often depends on the actor employing them. In this regard, see
Naudé Fourie, above n. 58, at 1-3.
129. For additional examples of methodological obstacles to studying IAM-
material, see Naudé Fourie, at Id.
130. Vick, above n. 25, at 188.
131. Id.
132. See R. Feldman, ‘Law’s Misguided Love Affair with Science’, 10 Minne-
sota Journal of Law 95 (2009).
133. Id.
identification of patterns and structures in the data that
mere textual analysis could not have done.
But while legal doctrinal methods may have constituted
the ‘right tools’ for particular ‘jobs’, they have not been
the only conceptual and analytical instruments of value
in the project’s methodological toolkit. In other words,
the project employs legal doctrinal methods and legal
theories, but not because non-legal methods and theories
fail to live up to expectation. Nor, for that matter, does
the project employ non-legal methods and theories
because legal methods and theories ‘disappoint’.134
Instead, the project employs a combination of legal and
non-legal methods and theories in order to realise spe-
cific research objectives, irrespective of whether these
objectives are predominantly legal or non-legal. The
development of conceptual models, for example, which
fulfil several important functions within this project,
could not have been done by relying solely on one
instrument in the methodological toolkit. The same
could be said about designing and developing the IAM-
practice database.
This is not to say, of course, that the distinctions
between legal and non-legal methodological elements
cease to exist, or that they become entirely insignificant.
In fact, in order to integrate different questions, theo-
ries, and methods – as (legal-)interdisciplinary research-
ers have to do, albeit in varying degrees – it is crucial to
understand what each element has to offer, what it can-
not offer, and how they might best complement each
other. Integration, as mentioned, remains both a ‘core
feature and major challenge of’ interdisciplinary
research,135 but the experience with this research project
indicates that the integration of legal doctrinal methods
does not present any more or less of a challenge than
those of other elements. Legal doctrinal methods have,
however, proved to be a synergetic fit with the ‘recursive
approach to problem solving’ underlying this project.136
One of the broader problems considered by this project
concerns the place of law in transnational regulatory
governance contexts – here, specifically with regard to
the transnational development context involving MDBs
and other co-financiers, MDB (donor and borrower)
member states, (public and private sector) project
implementing agencies, project-affected people, and
civil society actors.
This article concludes that the IAM-practice research
project has been able to generate new perspectives on
this matter firstly, because it has been based in a con-
structivist, interactional (as opposed to a positivistic) con-
ception of legal normativity.137 A second reason concerns
the project’s focus on IAM and MDB practice, as
134. Id.
135. Hirsch Hadorn et al., above n. 19, at 431.
136. Id.
137. See Section 1.1.
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opposed to being limited to institutional aspects.138
Thirdly, facilitated by the design and development of
the IAM-practice database, the project’s scope could
include the entire dataset, as opposed to a mere subset of
IAM-practice or selected case studies.139 And, finally,
because of its employment of legal doctrinal methods, in
combination with other methods and theories, the proj-
ect could conclude that law has a distinct place in trans-
national regulatory governance contexts – that is, if you
know where to look for law, and how to find it.
138. I.e. matters such as IAM-mandates, processes, functions, independence
– e.g. as reflected in their constitutive documents, operating procedures,
and MDB operational policy frameworks, which form the basis of IAM-
review mandates. For examples of such contributions, see e.g. R.E. Bis-
sell, ‘Institutional and Procedural Aspects of the Inspection Panel’, in G.
Alfredsson, and R. Ring (eds.), The Inspection Panel of the World Bank:
A Different Complaints Procedure (2001) 107; and see E. Baimu and A.
Panou, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations and the World
Bank Inspection Panel: Parallel Tracks Unlikely to Converge?’, in H.
Cissé, D.D. Bradlow & B. Kingsbury (eds.), The World Bank Legal
Review: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Gover-
nance (2011), e-Book. Note, this article does not dispute the value of
such contributions; it merely argues that there are not enough empirical
contributions in this particular area of study.
139. See e.g. S. Ananthanarayanan, ‘A Crippled Inspection Panel’, India
Together (2004), available at: <http:// www. indiatogether. org/ 2004/ jul/
hrt -wbinspect. htm> (last visited 31 October 2015); and see R. Ole-
schak-Pillai, ‘Accountability of International Organisations: An Analysis
of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel’, in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis
& P. Schmitt (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by
International Organisations (2010), at 406.
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